2.4 KiB

Raw Blame History

RFC-0014: Secure Relay Protocol

Overview

The Secure Relay Protocol (Layer 2) enables private, onion-routed communication within the Libertaria network. It upgrades the transport layer with privacy-preserving encryption, forward secrecy, and session binding.

1. Cryptographic Primitive

Encryption: XChaCha20-Poly1305 (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data).
Key Exchange: X25519 (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) for ephemeral shared secrets.
Forward Secrecy: Yes. Each circuit uses ephemeral keys.

2. Session Binding & Usage

2.1 The "Sticky" Session

To balance privacy with network health (spam protection), sessions are pseudo-anonymous but stable.

Session ID: 16 bytes. Generated randomly by the Client (Initiator).
Stickiness: Packets within a context flow re-use the Session ID.
Privacy: Routers see only the Session ID (for rate-limiting) but cannot correlate it to a user Identity (DID) without owning the private key.

2.2 Nonce Construction

Strict binding of Session ID to the Encryption Nonce prevents replay and context-confusion attacks. Warning: The protocol REJECTS any packet where the nonce does not match the session.

Nonce Format (24 bytes):

| Session ID (16 bytes) | Counter/Random (8 bytes) |

Byte 0-15: MUST match the declared Session ID.
Byte 16-23: Monotonically increasing counter or random salt (Client controlled).

2.3 Key Management

Relay Keys: Public X25519 keys are distributed via the DHT/Federation (dht_nodes message).
Circuit Keys: Ephemeral keys are generated per circuit (or per packet in stateless mode).
Optimization: Sticky Sessions allow reusing the Ephemeral Key Pair for multiple packets, reducing ECDH overhead for high-throughput flows.

3. Wire Format (RelayPacket)

struct RelayPacket {
    ephemeral_key: [32]u8, // Network Byte Order
    nonce:         [24]u8, // [SessionID (16) | Rand (8)]
    ciphertext:    []u8,   // Encrypted [NextHop + Payload]
}

4. Privacy Considerations

Timestamp Leakage: The protocol deliberately excludes unencrypted timestamps in the header to prevent traffic correlation attacks.
Client Sovereignty: The Client generates the Session ID. Bridges/Guards cannot force a tracking ID onto the client.
Verification: Relays verify the Tag (Poly1305) and Session Binding before forwarding.

2.4 KiB Raw Blame History